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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
The Appellant, by and through his counsel of 
record, respectfully moves the court for a rehearing 
11ith respect to the opinion and decision filed by the 
1'11tll't on June 21, 1966, on the grounds and for the 
reasons as follows: 
1. The court apparently has overlooked relevant 
niid deeisi, e facts an<l authorities duly submitted by 
1 
counsel and not referred to or disposed of in th . . . 
• • e op1111u:1 
and decision of the court. 
A. The court apparently overlooked tli 1 
e '']' 
pellant's point regarding the undisputed fact liJ:,· ~ 
clients or accounts of public accountants ma\' 
1
, : 
sold to other accountants; that in the industry ·thn 
are marketable. · 
B. The court overlooked the Appellant's poi
11
; 
that the record demonstrated without dispute that 
the defendants appropriated to themselves tlit 
relevant clients of the partnership prior to plain 
tiffs' exclusion. 
C. The court did not pass upon Appellanl1 
point that he was entitled to credit for work iu 
progress based upon the relative investment in 
such asset made by the firm prior to the date o! 
dissolution. 
2. Analysis and consideration of the points :1111i 
authorities submitted by the Appellant overlooked 11! 
the court would necessarily reqmre a different resuli 
than that reached. 
I 
3. The unusual circumstances denied Appellant : 
his right to a determination by a five-judge court. Ju' . 
tice Crockett disqualified himself prior to oral arg11 ! 
ment: Justice '"' ade died before the case was decideil 
Justice I-Ienroid did not participate in the rlecisinn 
Thus a combination of circumstances beyond Apve: i 
lant's control and indeed beyond anyone's coutro] ri .. 
2 
j lted in a situation where the case was decided by a ~l 
three-judge panel. Only two members of the panel were 
regular justices of this court. In addition to the con-
,titutional issue, Appellant suggests that these cir-
cumstances denied him plenary, vigorous consideration 
,,j' fire independent justices. 
WHEREFORE, Appellant respectfully prays 
tl 1at the court make and enter an order granting to 
Appellant a rehearing and that the opinion filed by 
this court in the above entitled case on June 21, 196() 
be withdrawn and that the court file an opinion analyz-
ing and disposing of the issues raised by the Appellant 
on this appeal. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I 
THE COURT I-IAS RULED THAT IT 'VILL 
(~RANT A REHEARING YVHERE THE 
ORIGINAL OPINION HAS NOT CONSID-
ERED A POINT 'VHICH 'VOULD CALL 
FOR A DIFFERENT RESULT AND 'VHERE 
SIGNIFICANT FACTS AND POINTS OF 
LAW HA\TE BEEN OVERLOOKED. 
Although the Supreme Court of Utah has held 
iliat it will not grant a rehearing to change unsatis-
3 
factory parts of an opinon, even where the parties lia'. 
so stipulated, Beaver County v. Home Indemnity Cr ·: 
(1935) 88 Ut. l, 52 P. (2d) 435, where no matenli I 
fact or principal of law has been disregarded, Adrun I 
• . I 
v. Portage Irr., Reservoir & Potver Co. (1938), \I.', I 
Ut. 20, 81 P. (2d) 368, or where an opinion mad, : 
corrected without changing the result, Salt Lake .Ci1
11 
• 
v. Telluride Power Co. (1933) 82 Ut. 622, 26 P.(2<li 
822, the court has stated that it will grant a rehearinrr 
~ 
where it has not satisfied constitutional or statutor) 
requirements or where the original opinion fails to co11· 
sider a point raised on appeal which could call for a 
different result. Fenstermaker v. Tribune Publishi1u1 
Co. (1896), 13 Ut. 532, 45 P. 1097. The rule of 
Adams v. Porta,qe, supra, indicates that a rehearing 
should be granted when material facts have been ayer· 
looked. 
Petitioner respectfully submits that the original 
opinion overlooked decisive material facts and respect· 
fully requests the court to reconsider this case in the 
context of these facts which constituted the primar: 
grounds upon which the appeal was predicated. 
POINT II. 
THE OPINION OF THE COURT FAILED 
TO CONSIDER THR UNDISPUTED FJC'l 
THAT UNDER CURRENT I N D U S 'f Ry . 
PRACTICE, NATIONAL AND LOCAL. CL!: 
4 
EXTS OR ACCOUNTS 
coCNTAN'l'S .MA y BE 
,\CCOUN'l'ANTS. 
OF PUBLIC AC-
SOLD TO OTHER 
The opinion of the court adopts the rule of 40 
Am. J ur., Partnerships, Sec. 271, p. 316, to the effect 
that professional partnerships have no good will which 
may be distributed as a firm asset upon distribution. 
This <lecision appears to have been reached because 
}lessina, Jackson, Caldwell & Co. did not carry good 
will on their books as an asset, did not characterize 
goo(l will as such in the partnership agreement, and 
failed to refer to good will in the provisions relating 
to distribution of firm assets upon dissolution. 
These conclusions overlook the uncontradicted facts 
in the record showing that current practices in the pub-
lic accountant industry not only recognize the sale of 
accounts, but that the industry has actually worked out 
and applied regular formulae for valuin~ accounts. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 15-18; Appellant's Reply 
llrief, pp. 3-11). The record is undisputed that in the 
industry a value is placed upon a practice separate 
and apart from the physical assets and so-called book 
rnlue amounts of the firm. (R. 344-346, 356-358, 349-
383; cf. the testimony of defendants' witnesses R. 561-
.566; see Appellant's Brief pp. 18-19; Appellant's 
Reply Brief, pp. 3-11). The record shows that the 
accounts of :Messina, .Jackson, Caldwell and Co. were 
\\']thin this general rule and could have been sold at 
:mr time relevant to this inquiry. 
5 
The opinion overlooks the uncontradicted f ar·i· : 
with respect to the salability of these accounts not ·
11 , ' \\'! I· ' 
standing the Appellant's direct argument that failuri· i 
of the trial court to reckon with them required revers:ii. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 16-19, Appellant's Reply Briel. 
pp. 3-11). ' 
This court has held consistently that a trier of fad, 
may not arbitrarily ignore uncontradicted credible 
evidence. De Vas v. Nob le ( 1962) 13 Ut.2d) 19.J, 
396 P. (2d) 290; Arnold Machinery Co. v. Intrusi01, 
PrePa.kt Inc., (1961), 11 Ut.(2d) 246, 357 P.l2d
1 I 
-~96; Jensen v. Logan City (1939) 96 Ut. 522, 88 P. 
( 2d) 459. Since this just rule governs the finder o! 
fact, Appellant respectfully submits that it should be 
enforced by this court in the formula ti on of its own 
decisions. The court should grant the petition for re· 
hearing to reconsider the opinion in view of the materini 
facts overlooked in the opinion of June 21, 1966. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS IT· 
SELF TO THE APPELLANT'S POINT THAT 
UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE DEMONSTRAT· 
ED CLEARLY THAT DEFENDANTS AP· ' 
PROPRIATED THE GOOD WILL OF THE I 
FIRlVI BEFORE NOTIFYING THE PLA!X· i 
TIFF OF HIS EXCLUSION FROM THI. 
l~IRlVI. 
6 
Iu its opinion, the court stated that the record dis-
elosed no solicitation of accounts on the part of the 
rlefendants; that defendant Caldwell accounted to the 
plaintiff, and that the plaintiff did solicit. 
Examination of the record shows that such find-
ings could only be made if the court overlooked the 
significance of relevant dates. The confusion surround-
ing the dates is clearly demonstrated in Respondents' 
Reply Brief, pp. 12-16. The trial court repeatedly 
asked for clarification of the time sequence and received 
confusing responses from defendant Caldwell. 
The defendant Caldwell became a general partner 
in the firm of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & Co. on 
April I, 1955. On April l, 1958 a new partnership 
agreement was executed. This was amended April l, 
1959 by providing for continuation of the firm for two 
fiscal years after the death of any partner with provi-
sion for payouts. On August 19, 1959, Marco Messina 
died. In March, 1960 an agreement was executed 
between plaintiff and defendants (Exhibit 5) which 
reaffirmed the intention of the parties to continue the 
partnership after the payout of the Messina estate. 
Suddenly, early in 1961, the defendants informed plain-
tiff that he was being thrown out of the firm as of 
March 31, 1962. Formal notice to this effect was given 
on April 2, 1961. 
The court stated that the plaintiff solicited ac-
t'rHmts before dissolution while the defendants did not. 
,\ppellant insists that there is no evidence he ever 
7 
solicited accounts at any time. In any event <lef'ci 
1 ' · H a1tf 
have never claimed there was any solicitation b,, l · . , . . . , fl Ui11 
tiff until after he was advised that he was being tli 
ro1111 
out of the firm which he had devoted 20 years of Iii, 
life to building. The undisputed and indisputable fae: 
is that the notice of termination of April 3, 1961 \'Ill!· 
stituted a breach of the contract of March 5, l9liO 
111 
that it was a repudiation by defendants of their promi,c 
to renew and continue the partnership relationship 
The plaintiff had a positive duty to mitigate darnagci 
But even more important than the legal point 
involving the right and duty to mitigate damages 11en 
defendants' admissions as to the facts. Defendanh 
conceded that before the plaintiff was given any notict 
of their intention of evicting him, they had alread1 
satisfied themselves that they could hold the bulk of the 
firm's accounts, whether the plaintiff solicited or not. 
(See the detailed argument in Appellant's Brief, pp 
1 
24-31). And, as pointed out in Point IV of AppellanL 1' 
Reply Brief, pp. 11-16, the fact that the defendant' .. 
had appropriated to themselves the good will of tlit I 
firm before excluding the plaintiff could not properh I 
be ignored by the trial court. See Smith v. B1ill (19.18 i 
50 Cal. ( 2d) 294, 325 P. ( 2d) 463. The record ~]earh ; 
shows the defendants admitted on cross-exammat1111: I 
that they were sure they had secured the one asset moi i 
valuabl~ to professional practice-the substantial dieiit i 
-before notifying the plaintiff that his relatinnsh:i i 
was terminated. (R. 228-229, et seq.) The office rn:1 1' ! 
8 
l 
·ioer of the firm admitted conversations where this con-
'" clusion was reached. ( R. 234, 238, 240-242, 246-247) . 
r~lso bearing on this point, the court stated that 
the plaintiff established a business relationship with 
)Ir. Paul Maxwell in January, 1962, three months 
before the dissolution of the old firm. The opinion relates 
that Maxwell immediately left the firm and took cer-
tain clients and accounts and their records with him, 
and that the business relationship was merely for-
malized in May, 1962. As this too appears to be a 
ground for imputing scienter to the plaintiff, it is 
re.1pectfu1ly pointed out that the court overlooks the 
time sequence. (Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 16, R. 
J;i~). The record is without contradiction that plaintiff 
took no action with respect to moving elsewhere or 
forming any other association until many months after 
he was notified by defendants that his relationship with 
them was terminated. Before they gave him such notice, 
defendants admit that they satisfied themselves that 
they could hold the clients. 
Appellant respectfully submits that these om1s-
swns of fact are material and justify reconsideration 
b)· the court. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT PASS UPON THE 
(~l'RSTION AS TO 'VHETHER THE PLAIN-
TIFF "r i\S ENTITLED TO CREDIT FOR 
9 
'¥ORK IN PROGRESS BASED UPON Tm: . 
RELATIVE INVEST~IENT IN SUCH ASSEt f 
l\IADE BY THE FIRM PRIOR TO THE DX!l ; 
OF DISSOLUTION OF THE FIRM. 1 
The opinion states that the Appellant's first foui 
points may be combined into one inclusive questiui, • 
The Appellant respectfully submits that bis Point !\" 1 
relating to equitable division of the asset referred lri i 
as work in progress is separate and distinct from t1 1r ! 
first three points, which involve the issue of the tirm 1 '. 
good will and its appropriation by the defendant\ ! 
Petitioner respectfully requests the court to reconsi1le1 / 
this point raised on appeal and overlooked in the opinio11 i 
of June 21, 1966. ! 
I 
POINT v. I 
THE ANAMOLOUS CONSTRUCTIOX OF I 
THE COURT RENDERING THE DEClSIO~ l 
JUSTIFIES A RECONSIDERATION OF TllI i 
CASE BY A FULL COURT. I 
Prior to oral argument of the case, Justice Crockc\! : 
disqualified himself. Judge Nelson was designate°. I' I 
act as a fifth member of the court for the considera!tm , 
of the case. It appears from the opinion that Ji;itw i 
Henroid did not participate in the decision. 'fhe reconl ! 
of the court indicate that before the decision wai reii · 
dered, Justice Wade died. Apparently he did ~' 1 
participate in the decision. Appellant's counsel h •' 
10 
11
)cd that there are many instances where the opnuou 
uf one of the justices of this court is so persuasive that, 
while it is first offered as a dissenting opinion, it becomes 
the considered view of the majority. Consideration of 
cases by five justices on appeal is for the clear and 
unmistakable purpose of exposing the Appellant's ar-
guments to the diversified views and experiences of five 
independent members of the court. In this case, through 
nobody's fault, but as a result of the circumstances 
which developed between the time of argument and the 
rendering of the decision, the arguments made by the 
Appellant were not considered by five or even four 
members of the court. Aside from the issues arising 
under the state Constitution, therefore, Appellant sug-
gests that the unusual circumstances justify reconsider-
ation of the case by a full court. 
Article VIII, Section 2 of the state constitution 
provides: 
"A majority of the judges constituting the 
court shall be necessary to form a quorum or 
render a decision." 
l'his is not a case like In Re 'l.1hompson Estate (1927) 
iH't. 17, 269 P. 103, where the court held that a peti-
tioner was estopped from arguing that the court was 
irregularly constituted. In that case the petitioner had 
made his arguments to a court consisting of four regular 
. .iustil·es awl one district judge; he raised the question 
fur the first time after a decision was reached. State 
'· Gro11er (1942) 102 Ut. 459, 132 P. (2d) 125 holds 
11 
that a justice on leave, having heard the ... 
<11 guintl' 
could render a decisive ( 3-2) vote. N ezJhi Ir.. . 
1 • . 11,q11l101, . 
lo. v. Jenkins (1893) 8 Ut. 452, 32 P. 699 Jioll 1 ' (,\ \ ·1. I 
a non-participating justice could sit and be ,. 
1
' 
' dll1!1f:I 1 
toward constituting a quorum. None of tliesc , . · 
tR\t• 
appears to preclude a construction of the Coustitutiin. 
to the effect that at least three regular members,, 
the court are necessary to render a decision. Jn tnr 
instant case, only two regular justices of the eourt par 
ticipated. It is arguable that since the decision in ti,. 
instant case was rendered by only two justices, un1], 1 
Article VIII, Section 2 it is not a final decisio1111f ti: 
court. 
Even more persuasive than the legalistic arg1: 
ment, however, is the experience which all adrnca\1, 
have had in presentation of an issue to five as 1li, 
tinguished from three or any less number of Yirilt I 
active mi1:ds. J?issent' 'necessarily stirs further i~quir: 
1
1 
and cons1dera ti on. I he loss of the opporturnty r: 1 
present a closely contested question to less than \1 1 i 
number required by law in a given situation represP1 11 ! 
the loss of a very valuable right in a practical 'eiH ! 
The books abound with cases where new trials u•: 
granted because one member of a jury is found ti, lia· i 
been disqualified or was improperly permitted to 1en" 
It is submitted that a similar rule has an apprupri:d 
application in the instant case where only two off, : 
· · · · d · h l the e11\lir l regular Justices participate m t e case am · 
1 
panel consisted of only three judges. 1 
12 
'fhe point has particular significance in this 
ca\e. The plaintiff here admittedly was incapacitated 
3 ~ a 1ritness. Defendant Caldwell testified at great . 
length with respect to conversations allegedly occurring 
lJetll'een him and the plaintiff after plaintiff was notified 
1Jiat the partnership relationship was terminated . .Mr. 
Caldwell could not have been unaware that his testi-
mony purporting to reflect conversations with plaintiff 
could not be challenged directly. It is particularly 
important in the instant case therefore that the issues 
he evaluated in the light of the facts which could not 
be disputed. One of these facts related to relev:mt 
industry practices. Another involved conversations and 
cirrnmstances to which the defendants admitted. The 
discovery procedures which led to these admissions 
are immaterial; the admissions themselves are the sig-
nificant and controlling factors. It is reasonable to 
believe that tfre independent members of the court might 
hm probed more deeply into the evidence to more fully 
analyzr Appellant's arguments with respect to the un-
disputed realities of the situation. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons given in this Petition, most of which 
:ire more fully discussed in Appellant's Brief and Ap-
pellant's lleply Brief, plaintiff submits that a new hear-
itig should he awarded before a fully constituted court 
'if fi1e ju.~tices. Petitioner suggests that the Honorable 
13 
R. L. Tuckett, newly appointed member of tlie cuii: 1 
might properly consider the case with the other rn~ 11 , , 
hers of the court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUll~IITTED ti' , , 
;t - -- '- ,11~ N1 !,. day of July, 1966. t;., . _ 
1i,..., -v ));. ),,-i·, /);i_ccc~~ , 
GEORGE M. McMILLAX',,, i 
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